Introduction
In 2005 the European Union established an EU-wide CO 2 emissions trading system to reduce its greenhose gas emissions by 8 % in 2012 from its baseline emissions in 1990.
Similarly, in August 2007 the Western Climate Initiative, launched by seven US states and four Canadian provinces, planned to lay the foundation for an international emissions trading scheme that involves both the United States and Canada and pursues the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 15 % from 2005 levels by 2020.
Countries under the umbrella of an international emissions trading scheme, e.g. the EU member states, are observed to promote green energy by feed-in tariffs or green tradable certificates. Feed-in tariffs (or renewable energy tariffs) are output subsidies per unit of produced energy (Menanteau et al. 2003) and green certificates are tradable commodities 'earned' by green energy producers for each unit of their output which producers of black energy are then obliged to purchase in some proportion to their output. Feed-in tariffs are in operation in 63 jurisdictions around the world, including Canada, France, Germany, and in a dozen states in the United States. National trading schemes of green certificates are in use in e.g. the UK, Italy and some US states.
International emissions trading schemes aim at coping with climate change by curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but the economic rationale for promoting green energy is less clear. The literature suggests two justifications for combining emissions control with green energy promotion policies. In the presence of learning spillovers 1 subsidizing the use of renewable energy is efficiency enhancing especially in their innovatory phase in order to spur learning effects that are beneficial for renewable energy producers as well as for society at large (Bläsi and Requate 2007 , Fischer and Newall 2008 , Lehmann 2009 ). The second justification is energy security, i.e. the reduction of the dependence from insecure fossil fuel imports. Assuming uncertainty about the import price of fossil fuel, Eichner and Pethig (2009b) show that risk averse governments of small open economies may choose to subsidize green energy to reduce the price uncertainty.
The present paper suggests and investigates another rationale for subsidizing green energy. Countries may have a strategic incentive to use (positive or negative) green subsidies 1 Learning spillovers are related to technological or R&D spillovers. For an analysis of technological spillovers in the environmental context we refer to Goulder and Mathai (2000) .
in order to manipulate in their favour the permit price. To make this thesis precise, we consider a group of countries operating joint emissions trading scheme. Each country produces green energy with a domestic resource and black energy by means of fossil fuel imported from the rest of the world. The domestic resource is also used for the production of an internationally tradable composite consumer good.
Focussing on competitive economies and welfare-maximizing governments, we show that it is efficient for the group of countries to refrain from subsidizing green energy. The
governments of small open countries who take as given the price in the international permit market find it optimal not to subsidize green energy and thus also secure efficiency from the viewpoint of the group of countries. In contrast, governments of large countries are aware that their policy affects the permit price and therefore find it optimal to use the subsidy for distorting the permit price in their favor while behaving Nash with regard to the other countries' subsidies. The strategic incentives to promote green energy differ markedly between permit-exporting and permit-importing countries.
In the field of international environmental economics strategic choice of environmental policy instruments has been investigated e.g. by Barrett (1994) , Rauscher (1994) and Ulph (1996) . There is only a small literature, however, that investigates strategic incentives of national regulation in the context of international emissions trading. In Bréchet and Peralta (2008) and Eichner and Pethig (2009a) national governments levy energy or emissions taxes to manipulate the permit price in their favor. In Santore et al. (2003) national regulators impose emissions taxes and tariffs to affect the permit price in a model with spillovers.
We are not aware of contributions to the literature that explore -as we aim to do in the present paper -the interaction of international emissions trading and national green energy promotion policies.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 characterizes the efficient allocation and the first-best policy-supported competitive equilibrium for the group of countries. Section 4 analyzes subsidy competition for the smallcountry case of governments which ignore the impact of their policy on the permit price and for the large-country case of governments which account for the impact of their policies on the permit price. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider a group of n countries embedded in the world economy. All countries in that group participate in an international CO 2 emissions trading scheme to be specified below.
Country 1, ..., i n = employs the resource input xi r to produce the amount si x of a consumer good (good X), the same in all countries, according to the production function
Moreover, country i produces energy,
consisting of black energy si b and green energy si g . Both kinds of energy are considered in (2) to be perfect substitutes, for simplicity. Black energy is generated from fossil fuel i e , ( )
and green energy is produced with the resource input gi r via
The production functions , and CO 2 emissions are proportional to the input of fossil fuel and therefore we simply use i e to denote the fuel input as well as CO 2 emissions. The group of countries as a whole has committed to restrict its total carbon emissions to some level 0 c > . To meet that emissions target c , the countries take part in a joint emissions trading scheme. Each country i is assigned a national emissions cap i c such that 
where i r is the resource endowment of country i owned by its representative consumer. In this section we determine the Pareto efficient allocation via maximizing the weighted sum of utilities under the constraints (1) -(4), (6), (7) and
The last equation is the group's consolidated trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
We use that constraint rather than all countries' trade balances (8) to characterize the efficient allocation, because owing to (6) summing (8) over all countries yields
The efficient allocation is a solution to the Lagrangean 
respectively, and the consumer maximizes her utility (5) subject to the budget constraint 
From comparing the equations (9) and (10) n s s = = = 2 As mentioned above (Section 1), in practice green energy promotion often takes the form of feed-in tariffs or green certificates schemes. However, at the high level of abstraction of our model the incidence of these policy schemes is the same as that of government subsidies. 3 The rate i s is not sign-constrained. To avoid clumsy wording, we refer to i s not only if i s > 0, but also if i s < 0, in which case it is a tax on green energy rather than a subsidy (in the narrow sense). 4 According to the definition of bi φ the producer of black energy gets the permit endowment i c for free. The alternative assumption of auctioning permits would leave the results unchanged at the high level of abstraction of our model.
The clear message of Proposition 1 is that for the group of countries as a whole, subsidies are distortionary and render inefficient the equilibrium allocation. That result does not come as a surprise because, given the emissions trading scheme, there are no externalities or other market imperfections in our n-country economy and therefore any subsidy or tax (based on endogenous economic variables) is bound to reduce the welfare of the group of countries. If curbing emissions is considered the only policy target and if group efficiency is an agreed-upon target, Proposition 1 advises governments to abstain from subsidizing green energy altogether. It is not clear, though, whether green energy subsidies are also unfavorable from the viewpoint of individual countries whose governments (also) consider curbing emissions as the only policy target but focus on national welfare rather than on group efficiency. We will address that issue in the next section.
Subsidy competition
The small country case. Consider first a small open country i whose government has at its disposal a green energy subsidy, takes the permit price e π as given and aims at maximizing its country's welfare defined as its representative consumer's utility. The comparative static effects of a change in i s and e π (derived in the Appendix A) on country i's welfare are
where 5 2 2 1 : 0
:
The government of country i takes the permit price as given (which means that we set d e π = 0 in (11)) and chooses its subsidy such that d 0 i u = . The straightforward conclusion from (11) is 5 We introduce these terms (and some more below) to improve the readability of the paper. The list of all auxiliatory terms defined is provided in the Appendix B.
Proposition 2. (Small country case). If the government of country i seeks to maximize national welfare taking the permit price as given, it refrains from subsidizing green energy.
According to Proposition 2, the competitive equilibrium without subsidies is therefore not only efficient from the viewpoint of the group of countries (Proposition 1) but also welfare maximizing from the viewpoint of individual governments of small countries (Proposition 2) capable to subsidize green energy.
The large country case. Now we turn to green energy subsidies in a group of large open countries whose welfare maximizing governments account for the influence of their policy on the permit price e π . Analogous to our procedure in the small country case, we envisage an individual country i and explore that country's change in welfare when subsidy rates vary. In contrast to (11), however, the government now takes into account in its optimization calculus how the equilibrium permit price changes in response to variations in its own subsidy and in the other countries' subsidies. Formally, (11) is replaced by E π for permit-exporting countries because that sign will play an important role for the conclusions to be derived.
Next we rewrite equation (6) 
where and i i δ ζ are defined in (13) and (14). We insert (15) into (12) and obtain
To characterize government i's best reply to given subsidy rates of all other countries we
where ( )
The first-order condition for the best reply is d 0 d 
The conclusion to be drawn from (19) 
The right side of that inequality is positive so that (20) (21) s > ) to discourage its black energy production as well as its fossil fuel consumption and generation of emissions. The drop in the demand for permits lowers both the permit price and the need for permits and thus the county's permit import bill.
That is welfare enhancing up to some point where the distortion in production compensates the advantage of raising the subsidy. Conversely, the permit-exporting country applies a negative subsidy (= tax) on green energy ( 0 i s < ) to stimulate black energy production and with it the country's permit demand. The intention is to raise the permit price which then increases national income via rising revenues form permit exports. The net advantage of successive increases in the tax rate diminishes because of rising distortions in production.
Note that production inefficiencies result whenever 0 i s ≠ , and that the distortions are particularly severe because s is negative for some countries and positive for others.
Negative green energy subsidies (= taxes) do not appear to be a relevant issue in practical policy although they may be found as (possibly unintended) side effects of complex regulation. Assuming that negative subsidies are not viable, e.g. because of strong resistance from green lobby groups, the governments of permit-exporting countries can be con- 
We aim at offering some thumb estimates of all components of (23). The transformations: turn (23) into
What do we know about the order of magnitude of the terms [1] through [8] in (24) E π < appears to be likely for all permit-exporting countries.
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Concluding remarks
The present paper suggests that strategic incentives may be a rationale for subsidizing green energy when countries operate a joint emissions trading scheme. Welfare maximizing governments of large countries put a positive or negative subsidy on green energy in order to manipulate the permit price. Subsidy competition of small countries turns out to be efficient from the perspective of the group of countries, since all countries refrain from green energy subsidies. In contrast, subsidy competition of large countries renders the multi-country economy inefficient. In that case the policy implication is 'subsidy harmonization at the level zero'.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that the simple assumptions of our stylized model put some limits on the generality of results. E.g., energy production takes place under perfect competition which is in stark contrast to energy markets in the real world. The analysis of monopolistic or oligopolistic energy producers is therefore an important task for future research. Also, we assume that energy is traded on domestic markets only and no fossil fuel is supplied in any country of the group. These assumptions may be considered acceptable as a first approximation, e.g. for the European Union, but it is necessary to examine 
